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Current debates about obligations to future generations have reached 
a deadlock. The source of the stoppage is the generally accepted analysis 
of intcrgencrational morality first articulated by Derek Parfit more than a 
decade ago.1 Parfit's analysis appears to bring the result that no currently 
favored moral theory is able to support our intuitive judgments regarding 
obligations to future generations. Adopted by numerous philosophers/ 
the conceptual framework Parfit advances is becoming commonplace in 
philosophy texts addressing contemporary moral problems generally and 
obligations to future generations in particular.3 Moreover, Parfit's 
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Parfit 's development of this approach spans several articles and 
culminates in his most recent work, Reasons and Persons (New York: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1984). The articles preceding this text include the 
following (listed in chronological order): "Rights Interests and Possible 
People" in Samuel Gorovitz ed., Moral Problems in Medicine (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976); "Future Generations: Further Problems" 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (Spring 1982); "Energy Policy and the 
Further Future: The Identity Problem" in Douglas MacLean and Peter 
Brown, eds.. Energy Policy and the Future (Totowa: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1983); "Energy Policy and the Further Future: The Social 
Discount Rate" in MacLean and Brown, eds., Energy Policy and the 
Future. 
Philosophers who adopt the nonidentity problem as a starting point for 
discussing obligations to future generations include (but are not limited to) 
the following: George Annas, Annette Baier, Michael Bayles, Richard 
DeGeorge, Trudy Govier, Hardy Jones, Gregory Kavka, Douglas MacLean, 
Jan Narveson, Thomas Schwartz, and James Sterba. 
3For instance, the following texts discuss a number of contemporary moral 
problems and invoke Parfit's approach in connection with the issue of 
obligations to future generations: Samuel Gorovitz ed., Moral Problems in 
Medicine; Jan Narveson ed., Moral Issues (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1985); Richard L. Purtill ed., Moral Dilemmas (Belmont: Wadsworth 
Auslrgung, Vol. XIV, No. 2 
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Publishing Co., 1985); Tom Regan ed., Earthbound (Philadelphia: Temple 
Univ., Press, 1984); James Sterba ed., Morality in Practice (Belmont: 
Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1984), Richard A. Wasserstrom ed., Today's 
Moral Problems 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1979). 
Works dealing exclusively with the topic of obligations to future 
generations include R. I. Sikora And Brian Barry eds., Obligations to 
Future Generations (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1978) and Ernest 
Partridge ed., Responsibilities to Future Generations (Buffalo: 
Prometheus Books, 1981); both of these works include detailed discussions 
of the nonidentity problem. 
4The recent proliferation of tort claims alleging wrongful life, wrongful 
birth, wrongful pregnancy and dissatisfied life are illustrative of current 
trends in the law. For a good overview of these cases and the philosophical 
issues they raise, see Thomas Foutz, "Wrongful Life: The Right Not To Be 
Born/' Tulane Law Review 54 (1980). My article, 'The Ascription of Rights in 
Wrongful Life Suits" Law and Philosophy 6 (1987), explores in detail the 
basis for granting recovery to plaintiffs in wrongful life suits. 
5See, for example, Robert Baker, "Protecting the Unconceived" in Barry 
Hoffmaster, John Davis, and Sarah Shorten, eds., Contemporary Issues In 
Biomedical Ethics (Clifton: The Humana Press, Inc., 1978); Michael Baylcs, 
"Comments on 'Protecting the Unconceived': Butchers, Bakers, and 
Candlestick Makers" in Hoffmaster, Davis, and Shorten, eds., 
Contemporary Issues In Biomedical Ethics; Paul Camenisch, "Abortion: 
for the festus's own sake?" Hastings Center Report 6 (April 1976); Hardy 
Jones, "Genetic Endowment and Obligations to Future Generations" in 
Ernest Partridge ed., Responsibilities To Future Generations; Burton M. 
Leiser, 'The New Genetics and Lives Not Worth Living" in John J. Buckley 
ed., Genetics Now: Ethical Issues In Genetics Research (Washington D.C.: 
University Press of America, 1978); L.M. Purdy, "Genetic Diseases: Can 
Having Children Be Immoral?" in Buckley ed., Genetics Now Paul 
Ramsey, "Shall We Reproduce?" Journal of the American Medical 
Association 200 (June 1972); and John Robertson, "In Vitro Conception and 
Harm to the Unborn" in Ronald Munson ed., Intervention And Reflection, 
Basic Issues in Medical Ethics, 2nd ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing 
Co., 1983). 
^ v e r a l articles that point to the relevance of the nonidentity problem to 
matters of public policy can be found in Michael Bayles ed., Ethics and 
Population Policy (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1976); Michael 
Bayles, Reproductive Ethics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1984); 
Michael Baylcs, Morality and Population Policy (University: The Univ. of 
Alabama Press, 1980); and Douglas MacLean and Peter Brown, eds., 
Energy Policy and the Future. 
approach is beginning to exercise considerable influence outside 
philosophical circles-in legal,4 medical,5 and public policy debates.6 
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The task of the present study is twofold. I begin by briefly reviewing 
the central reasons for thinking that Parfit's thesis is correct. This sets the 
stage for arguments that extend Parfit's analysis to intragenerational 
morality. I then offer a critical evaluation of both analyses, and in so doing 
work toward a resolution of the current deadlock. In closing, I suggest that 
certain problems remain unresolved. 
1 
One of the most intriguing aspects of recent discussions concerning 
obligations to future generations is what is sometimes called "the 
nonidentity problem." This problem arises in virtue of the fact that many 
of the choices confronting present persons will change the membership of 
future generations: those future persons who would exist as a result of our 
choosing one course of action are often nonidentical with those future 
persons who would exist as a result of our choosing some other course of 
action. Because of this, present persons can apparently justify a wide 
range of actions by appealing to the fact that no particular future persons 
are made worse off than they otherwise would be. The result is a striking 
mismatch between our considered judgments about obligations to future 
persons, on the one hand, and the philosophical support for these 
judgments, on the other hand. The following example bears this out.7 
Imagine the situation of a woman who is trying to decide whether to 
conceive a child now or several months from now. Because of a certain 
medication she is taking, if she opts to conceive a child now, the child she 
conceives will suffer terrible birth defects and have a life that is barely 
worth living. If, on the other hand, she stops taking medication and waits 
three months before getting pregnant, she will almost certainly have a 
normal child. Suppose the woman decides not to wait. She gives birth to a 
defective child. In a situation of this kind, we are inclined to judge that the 
woman should have waited, in order to give her child a better start in life. 
However, we apparently lack a justification for this intuitive view. After all, 
if the prospective mother had waited, then the normal child she would 
thereby conceive would be nonidentical to the unhealthy child she does 
conceive. It is misleading, then, to suppose that she has made the 
defective child worse off than it otherwise would be, since if she had the 
normal child, the defective child would not be. Nor does it seem that the 
woman has violated the rights of her defective child: if the child has a 
right-e.g., to a minimally decent start in life, presumably she would prefer 
not to exercise it. After all, the child's choosing to exercise this right is 
tantamount to her choosing never to have existed. So, provided that the 
7 An analogue of this case is discussed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and 
Persons, pp. 358 ff and by James Sterba in Stcrba ed., Morality in Practice, 
introduction to section II. 
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life she lives will be better than not existing, the child would prefer not to 
exercise the right. 
This example illustrates the following general points. First, our 
choices sometimes alter the identities of persons who exist at future times. 
1 refer to choices of this kind as "different person choices." Although 
reproductive choices are an obvious example of how the choices we make 
in the present alter the identities of future individuals, there are also a 
large number of non-reproductive decisions that change the membership 
of future generations. For many choices present persons make will affect 
the timing of conceptions and therefore the identities of future people. 
Thus different person choices are by no means limited to straightforward 
reproductive decisions. A second point that the above example serves to 
illustrate is that different person choices pose a prima facie problem for 
attempts to justify intuitive judgments about obligations to future persons. 
1 shall refer to this, and to the related problems of justification that I shall 
describe monentarily, as "nonidentity problems." 
In what follows, 1 argue that two different versions of the nonidentity 
problem can be distinguished. The version of the nonidentity problem to 
which Parfit has called our attention arises only in the context of different 
person choices. I shall refer to this version as the strong version and 
abbreviate it N1PS. More precisely, what Parfit has shown is that NIP S 
applies to future generations in situations where 
an act or policy that changes the identities of future persons does not 
make those persons worse off than they otherwise would be, because if 
the act (or policy) had not been selected, those very persons would 
never have existed. 
The extent of application of NIPS is broader than Parfit and others 
have heretofore supposed. As I shall show momentarily, NIPS bears on 
intragenerational as well as intergenerational moral problems. First, 
however, consider the following plausible tale which provides an 
illustration of how the nonidentity problem arises in present person 
contexts. Supose a practice of racial discrimination against black people 
prevents the best candidate from being hired for a particular job. Suppose 
the white person who is hired in his place is shortly afterwards required to 
go on a business trip to a remote rural village and the plane he flies in 
crashes, fatally injuring all passengers on board. Moreover, we might 
imagine that the flight in question is the only one available on this day and 
the business to be conducted cannot be postponed. Finally, suppose that 
the sole employee qualified to perform these transactions is the recently 
hired individual. If this were the case, then one could reasonably suppose 
that, but for the policy of discrimination, the black individual who would 
have been hired for this particular job would no longer exist. Or, to put it 
another way, assuming that the life this black person continues to live is 
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better than nothing, he cannot prefer, all things considered, that the policy 
of racial discrimination that cost him his job not have been in force at the 
time in question, since a non-discriminatory policy would have cost him his 
life. It should also be noted with respect to this case, that if the news of the 
white person's death in the plane crash failed to reach the black person, 
the above points would still hold. In other words, if the jobless man was 
despondent and depressed he would be foolishly so. Upon hearing and 
reflecting on the news of the dead employee's misfortune, he would have 
reason to be thankful and reason to no longer mourn the fact that he had 
been the victim of invidious discrimination in that particular case. 
This case lends credence to the view that 
an act or policy that causes the postponement of individuals' deaths 
does not make those individuals worse off than they otherwise would 
be, because if the act or policy had not been performed, those very 
individuals would no longer exist. 
The above point suggests that N1P8 applies to present persons. This new 
nonidentity problem has considerable force. For many of the choices we 
actually make at the present time will, unbeknownst to us, affect the 
timing of peoples' deaths. To feel the force of this point, one need only 
reflect upon the trivial factors that influence our being in particular places 
at particular times and, in turn, on the endless number of events that 
might have occurred and caused the date of one's death to be different 
than it actually will be. 
The framework developed above demonstrates the relevance of the 
nonidentity problem to choices affecting both future and present persons. 
Yet this framework can be further extended. In particular, I will now 
proceed to show how the nonidentity problem arises in situations where (1) 
the very same individuals come into existence and (2) the very same 
individuals cease to exist at the very same times. 1 shall refer to these 
situations as "same person choices" and to the version of the nonidentity 
problem that arises in connection with same person choices as the weak 
version (abbreviated NIPW). In order to see how the nonidentity problem 
can be extended to same person choices, it will be useful to pause for a 
moment and describe several background conditions relevant to its 
extension. I shall then offer an example that captures the intuitive idea 
behind the extended nonidentity problem before giving a precise 
formulation of it. 
To begin with, it is reasonable to suppose that what matters to a 
person who cares about his continued existence is not merely the future 
existence of an individual who is strictly identical with that person's 
present self, where in individual, a, is "strictly identical" with a future 
person, b, if and only if a and b have all of their (time-indexed) properties in 
common. Rather, when a person expresses a desire for continued 
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existence it is natural to think that this includes, for example, a hope and 
desire that there be a future person who carries on that person's most 
cherished projects and friendships and who manifests that person's most 
esteemed and central character traits and who regards the most important 
features of that person's personal history in the same way as the person in 
question now does. These aspects of our lives provide, in Bernard 
Williams's words, "the motive force" that "propels" us into the future and 
provides us with a reason for living. According to Williams, for a set of 
projects, values, and relationships to play this role, "...it does not have to be 
true that if ...(these things) were frustrated or in any of various ways...lost...|a 
person] would have to commit suicide....But he may feel in those 
circumstances that he might as well have died."8 
Following Robert Adams, let us say that a future self who manifests 
these important qualities bears a "self-interest relation" to one's present 
self.9 Although the presence of strict identity is necessary for the presence 
of a self-interest relation, it is clearly not sufficient. Thus, it is conceivable 
that a future person is strictly identical to my present self, yet bears no self-
interest relation to my present self. For instance, we can imagine it being 
the case that on November 20 of the year 2036, an individual exists who 
has the property of being the very person who is writing this paper on 
November 20 of 1986. Such a future person may, however, be rude and 
boorish and perhaps forgetful of some of the most important features of 
my present life. Then this person might not bear a self-interest relation to 
my present self, despite bearing the relation of strict identity. 
With these distinctions in mind, consider the following example. 
Suppose the government decides to store nuclear wastes at a location that 
is known to be unsafe. We might imagine a political scandal occurring: 
because it is an election year, representatives from the district where an 
alternative and safe site is located bribe other representatives to vote in 
favor of the unsafe location. They believe that the storage of nuclear 
wastes in their districts would undercut their chances for reelection. 
Suppose further that as a result of storing nuclear wastes at the unsafe, 
rather than the safe, site, radiation leaks into the underground reservoir of 
a nearby town thirty years later. The contaminated water causes a terrible 
but nonfatal disease to occur in one thousand persons within five years. 
Intuitively, it seems that the initial decision to store nuclear wastes at an 
unsafe site when an alternative and safe site was available was wrong. 
Surely, we do not judge that this decision is justified in virtue of what best 
suits the career plans of these politicians. Yet, the view that it is wrong to 
store nuclear wastes at a site where radiation leakage is likely to occur is 
8Bernard Williams, "Persons, character, and morality," in Williams, Moral 
Luck (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), p. 13. 
9Robert Adams, "Existence, Self-interest, and the Problem of Evil" Nous 13 
(1979) pp.60ff. 
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difficult to support, if we suppose that if wastes had been stored at the safe 
site, then the persons who suffered a terrible disease would not bear a self-
interest relation to their present selves. In other words, if we imagine it 
being the case that the decision to store wastes at the unsafe site affects 
the details of individuals' lives in such a way that they bear no self-interest 
relation to the persons they themselves would have become if the 
alternative policy had been selected instead, then the persons who suffer 
adversely would not prefer, all things considered, that their suffering never 
occur. 
With this example in mind, NIPW can be generated by noting that 
an act or policy that sustains the self-interest relation between present 
persons and their future selves will almost always be preferred to an 
act or policy that severs this relation. 
Applied to the nuclear example, N1PW tells us that although the decision 
to store wastes at an unsafe location harms present persons, in hindsight 
these persons would prefer this choice to the alternative choice of storing 
wastes at a safe location. The idea here is that individuals harmed would 
prefer (1) a situation where individuals exist who are strictly identical to 
their present selves and who bear a self-interest relation to their present 
selves but where these individuals are caused to suffer adverse 
consequences, over (2) a situation where individuals exist who are strictly 
identical to their present selves but no individuals exist who bear a self-
interest relation to their present selves. Or, to put the same point another 
way: persons can be expected to prefer (in hindsight) that an act that has 
harmed them occurred, if the harm that has resulted from the act matters 
less to them now than the contemplated loss these persons associate with 
their present selves lacking various features and relationships they now 
value very deeply. The same kind of reasons that motivate NIP, apply 
here as well. For, as Adams notes: "if our lives are good, we have the same 
sort of reason to be glad we have had them rather than lives that would 
have been even better but too thoroughly different, as we have to be glad 
that we exist and not better and happier people instead of us." 1 0 
As I suggested earlier, the details of the nuclear example could be 
filled out in such a way that N1PW applies to that case. Little reflection is 
required to make evident that the values we embrace, the projects to 
which we commit ourselves, the friendships we form and sustain, and the 
character traits we develop and strengthen are profoundly influenced by 
large scale policy decisions. After all, large scale policy decisions can 
affect, e.g., where we live and work; how much salary we command; the 
educational levels we attain; whether and whom we marry; the amount of 
leisure time available to us; and how we spend our time, energy, and 
'"Existence, Self-interest, and the Problem of Evil," p. 60. 
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money. Think, for example, of how past policies regarding the 
development and diffusion of technologies, such as the computer, 
television, and contraceptive pill have impacted individuals' values and 
lifestyles. The female contraceptive pill has spurred the sexual revolution, 
increased the presence of women in the work force, impacted the 
economy, transformed the nature of family life, and made it possible for 
women to wield greater political power. So, unless one holds the 
implausible view that fundamental character traits, career choices, values, 
and the like are immune to the kinds of social factors just adumbrated, it is 
very plausible to suppose that the decision to store nuclear wastes at an 
unsafe, rather than a safe site, would result in fundamental changes for 
individuals. In other words, it is plausible to suppose that if the policy of 
storing nuclear wastes at a safe location had been chosen, rather than the 
policy that was actually selected, this could result in persons who do not 
bear a self-interest relation to persons living now. 
The extent of application of NIPW is not limited to choices involving 
present persons. Applied to future persons, N1PW arises in virtue of the 
fact that 
an act or policy that sustains the self-interest relation between actual 
future persons at a given time, t, and their possible future selves at 
some time, t+n, will almost always be preferred to an act or policy that 
severs this relation. 
The reasons cited in connection with the nuclear example apply here as 
well. Namely, persons will in hindsight prefer to have been harmed if the 
harm they have suffered matters less to them than the loss they associate 
with there being no future self who carries on their most important projects 
and friendships and who manifests their most esteemed character traits. 
II 
So far I have distinguished two versions of the nonidentity problem: 
N1PS and NIPW . In this section, I do two things. First, I make more clear 
exactly why it might be thought that N1PS undercuts utilitarian and rights-
based claims about obligations to present or future persons. Second, I put 
forward reasons for doubting that NIPS actually succeeds in blocking right-
based claims about obligations to present or future persons. The central 
goal of this section is to alleviate the source of the deadlock in current 
debates about obligations to future persons; a subsidiary goal is to 
foreclose the possibility of extended versions of the nonidentity problem 
creating needless philosophical worries. 
To lay bare the reasons why nonidentity problems seemingly undercut 
obligations to future or present persons, it is instructive to consider the 
following example. Suppose Jones makes a promise to Smith, but fails to 
ever fulfill it. In breaking his promise, Jones acts wrongly, for Jones had no 
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The second account of why Smith waives his right may not seem very 
plausible to some readcrs-e.g., it might be thought that Smith would waive 
his right to be paid at the earlier time, but not waive his right to be paid 
now. I mention this second interpretation because it represents an 
extension of Parfit's argument against rights-based approaches to 
obligations to future persons. See Reasons and Persons, pp. 364-366. 
good reason not to keep it. Yet suppose that if Jones had acted properly 
and kept his promise to Smith, this would in fact be worse for Smith. For 
example, if the promise had been kept, Smith would have received a large 
sum of money from Jones and used it to purchase the Lambourghini he 
had always dreamed of owning. But the local dealer from which Smith 
would have bought a Lambourghini would have unknowingly sold Smith a 
car with faulty brakes, and a fatal accident would have resulted. As it 
turned out, the car with faulty brakes was sold to another customer and 
that individual was killed in a fatal automobile accident. So, we might 
reasonably predict that the failure of Jones to keep his promise saved 
Smith's life. 
Justifying the view that promises ought to be kept might involve either 
(1) appealing to the rights of the promisee or (2) appealing to utilitarian 
calculations which show that good consequences are maximized in a 
situation where promises are kept. The nonidentity problem appears to 
undercut both of these justifications for the judgment in question, 
however. 
First, N1P9 tells us the act of breaking a promise is not wrong to Smith 
in virtue of violating Smith's rights. After all, assuming Smith prefers that 
his death be postponed and values the postponement of his death more 
than he values the fulfillment of Jones's promise, it follows that Smith 
would in hindsight be glad that the acts required by his right were not 
performed. Alternatively, one can imagine a situation where Smith hears 
of the fatal accident that befell the individual who bought the car he would 
have bought, but for Jones's breaking his promise, and responds by saying, 
"I waive my right."11 
Second, NIPS tells us that the breach of promise is not wrong to Smith 
for utilitarian reasons, because an act that causes the postponement of 
Smith's death does not make Smith worse off than he otherwise would be. 
If Jones had not broken his promise to Smith, Smith would no longer exist. 
This result is nothing new for utilitarian theory. Acts such as the keeping of 
promises or the harming of innocent persons are not considered 
intrinsically wrong, according to the utilitarian position, but only wrong if 
they produce bad consequences. In the case under consideration, Jones's 
failure to keep his word is not wrong to Smith, in light of the fact that under 
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the circumstances this produces better consequences than the alternative 
act. 1 2 
Despite the apparent plausibility of NIPS a number of serious 
objections can be raised against it. These objections turn on our 
understanding of what it means to say that an individual has a right that 
holds against another individual and what it means to say that a right is in 
force or has been waived. Reconsider the Smith-Jones example. The force 
of NIP, in this context relies on the fact that (1) Smith is better off in the 
event that his right is violated or (2) Smith is glad that his right was violated 
or (3) Smith later says "I waive my right." Yet none of these points is a basis 
for denying that Jones acted wrongly in breaking his promise to Smith. 
(1) The fact that an individual is better off in the event that his rights 
are violated is not sufficient to show that acts violating his rights are 
permitted. After all, the determining factor in evaluating the 
permissibility of rights violations is not utilitarian. I might be better off 
with surgery than without surgery, yet if I have a right to decide whether 
surgery is performed on me and 1 choose not to undergo it, then my rights 
are violated if surgery is performed on me against my will. Having a right 
includes having a right to choose the wrong thing. What is foremost when 
the language of rights is employed is respect for the autonomy of persons, 
even where showing respect for persons fails to maximize utility. 
12Elsewhere, 1 have evaluated the specific argument Parfit advances in 
support of the claim that rights-based moral theories are vulnerable to the 
nonidentity prblem (i.e., NIPS applied to future persons) and tried to show 
that these arguments are flawed in certain crucial respects. See my 
"Reproductive Risk Taking and the Nonidentity Problem" Social Theory 
and Practice 13 (Summer, 1987). 
1 3 It is unclear how a rule utilitarian strategy for supporting Jones's 
obligation to keep his promise to Smith would work. On the one hand, a 
general policy of never keeping promises in situations where NIPS applies 
would produce better consequences than a general policy of keeping 
promises under those circumstances. Accordingly, the best state of affairs 
would be realized if we could identify cases falling under NIP, and not 
keep promises in that class of cases; failing that, we can at least say that in 
hindsight broken promises that maximize consequences for these reasons 
are vindicated. On the other hand, any version of rule utilitarianism 
places certain minimal constraints on the kinds of rules that are allowable. 
For instance, rules are required to be easily accessible and applicable, and 
they should not contain so many qualifiers that the distinction between 
rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism collapses all together. It is hard to 
see, then, how a plausible version of rule utilitarianism could take NIPW 
and NIPS into account. But, at the same time, I find the pragmatic 
restrictions on rules to be uncompelling, since the subject of ethics 
involves more complexity than these restrictions permit. 
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(2) The fact that Smith is in hindsight glad that Jones violated his right 
is also not sufficient to show that Jones's act is permissible. At best, Smith's 
gladness suggests that Jones is forgiven or excused or cast in a more 
favorable light. Smith's gladness does not, however, establish that Jones's 
failure to keep his promise was not a violation of Smith's rights. If Smith 
has a right that holds against Jones, and if Jones violated that right, then 
regardless of how Smith later feels about Jones's actions, Jones acts 
wrongly. For surely Smith's feelings could have been different—e.g., 
Jones's failure to keep his word to Smith could have made Smith angry. 
Our judgment concerning the morality of Smith not keeping his promise 
docs not depend upon how Jones later feels towards Smith, because 
Smith's feeling will be influenced by a number of facts irrelevant to the 
morality of Jones's action. To suppose that if Smith is glad then Jones's act 
is permissible, but if Smith is angry then Jones's act is wrong is to fall into 
the trap of thinking about rights and their violation in utilitarian terms. 
We believe that if promise breaking violates Smith's right, then it does so 
regardless of whether Smith is later glad his right is violated. I may be glad 
that you assaulted me last week, because if the assault had not occurred I 
would have boarded a plane that crashed in the ocean. But if I have a 
right not to be assaulted, then you have still violated my rights: I have a 
moral (and legal) claim against you. Once again, the notion of rights has 
considerable force. If we believe there are more or less absolute 
prohibitions against certain forms of conduct, then these prohibitions 
stand in the face of utilitarian calculations showing the performance of 
these acts produces the best consequences. 
(3) Finally, suppose that Smith learns that the Lambourghini he would 
have purchased has faulty brakes and that the individual who purchased it 
was fatally injured as a result. As I suggested a moment ago, Smith might 
respond to these facts by asserting "I waive my right that Jones keep his 
promise to me." Does this undermine a rights based objection to Jones's 
failure to keep his promise? I think not. If, at the time Jones failed to fulfill 
his promise, Smith had a right that holds against Jones and Smith had not 
waived that right, it follows that Jones's failing to fulfill his promise violates 
Smith's rights. Generally speaking, we can say that the claim that "x wil 
later waive his right that y do z" is not sufficient to establish that "y does not 
violate x's right by failing to do z now." Whatever Smith accomplishes by 
stating that he waives his right, his statement does not entail that Jones's 
past omissions do not violate Smith's rights. What Smith achieves by 
waiving his right is to void future obligations on the part of Jones to fulfill 
his promise. So, for example, if Jones does not in the future perform acts 
required by the original agreement, this is not a violation of Smith's rights, 
because Smith's right is no longer in force. 
The foregoing arguments apply, mutatis mutandis, to other versions of 
the nonidentity problem—i.e., NIPW and NIPS applied to future persons. 
For example, an act that sustains the self-interest relation present or 
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future persons bear to their future selves is wrong if it violates those 
persons' rights. This is so even if (1) these persons are made better off by 
acts that violate their rights or (2) the individuals in question are later glad 
that acts sustaining the self-interest relation were performed (because 
alternative acts would not sustain that relation) or (3) these individuals 
later waive their rights. 
I conclude that efforts to appeal to noinidentity problems to 
undermine rights-based obligations are unsuccessful. Unfortunately 
nonidentity problems are still a problem. The remaining difficulty they 
pose is that we are unable to explain the wrongness of acts in situations 
where NIPW or NIPS apply, if we cannot explain it by appealing to rights. 
So, unless we think that the wrongness of these kinds of acts can always be 
explained by appealing to rights, we are left without a justification for the 
wrongness of such acts. 1 4 
1 4 A number of philosophers have defended the position that present 
existence is a necessary condition for having any rights at all, and conclude 
that future persons cannot be the bearers of rights. See, for example, Rolf 
Sartorious, "Governmental Regulation and Intergenerational Justice" in 
Tibor Machan and M. Bruce Johnson, eds., Rights and Regulation (San 
Francisco: Pacific Institute for Public Policy, 1983); Ruth Macklin, "Can 
Future Generations Correctly Be Said to Have Rights?" in Ernest 
Partridge, ed. Responsibilities to Future Generations; Richard DeGeorge, 
T h e Environment, Rights and Future Generations," in K.E. Goodpaster 
and K.M. Sayre, Ethics and Problems of the Twenty First Century (Notre 
Dame Univ. Press, 1979); Edwin Delattre, "Rights, Responsibility and 
Future Persons," Ethics 82.3 (April 1972). Others have argued that present 
existence is not a necessary condition for having rights, and that the rights 
of future persons are just a special case of the ordinary rights that all 
persons hold. See, for example, Annette Baier, T h e Rights of Past and 
Future Persons," in Partridge ed.; Joel Feinberg, T h e Rights of Animals 
and Unborn Generations," in Partridge ed.; Donald Strole, "Rights, 
Obligations, and Future Generations," Auslegung 9 (1982); and K.S. 
Shrader-Frechette, "Technology Assessment, Future Generations and the 
Social Contract," in Shnrder-Frechette, Environmental Ethics (Pacific 
Grove: Boxwood Press, 1981). 
